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The September 2006 Global Financial
Stability Report (GFSR) presented a ba-
seline scenario of solid global growth,
contained inflation, and continued finan-
cial stability. However, it reported that risks
were tilted to the downside. Growth could
slow more sharply if the U.S. housing
market were to weaken rapidly; inflation
could spike, possibly reflecting rising
energy prices; and a disorderly unwind of
global imbalances remained a threat. De-
velopments since then have been broad-
ly in line with the baseline scenario. Mar-
ket sentiment has gravitated toward a
central scenario for a benign slowdown
which keeps inflationary pressures con-
tained. But downside risks remain and
there have been changes in underlying fi-
nancial conditions that warrant continu-
ed vigilance.
The U.S. housing market slowdown has
been more severe than some market par-
ticipants had expected. However, mar-
kets still expect this not to trigger broad-
er economic weakness in the U.S. eco-
nomy, and they view global growth pro-
spects as remaining positive. Neverthe-
less, the housing slowdown has increa-
sed concern about the sub-prime seg-
ments of the U.S. mortgage market, and
some early signs of distress in that sector
are emerging. The proliferation of securi-
tized mortgage structures makes it hard
to identify the ultimate holders of this
heightened mortgage credit risk, but the
wide distribution of risk could mitigate the
impact of potential losses.
Leverage indicators have also increased
in segments of the corporate sector (albeit
from low levels), in foreign exchange mar-
kets, and in hedge funds. Corporate pro-
fits appear robust, and balance sheets
strong, credit spreads have declined furt-
her, and default rates remain low. However,
leverage is increasing rapidly in private equi-
ty markets and valuations appear increa-
singly stretched. Rating agencies warn that
private equity-sponsored companies may
come under stress should global econo-
mic conditions weaken significantly.
Emerging market asset prices have reco-
vered strongly from the May-June turbu-
lence, which at least partly reflects conti-
nued fundamental improvements, inclu-
ding policy actions taken by some coun-
tries to stabilize market conditions and to
shore up credibility of domestic policies.
As sovereign issuance in international ca-
pital markets has declined, private cor-
porate issuance has filled the void. Hou-
sehold and corporate credit have grown
strongly in emerging Europe and Central
Asia. Foreign inflows have increased into
sub-Saharan Africa as these countries ha-
ve become a new frontier in investing in-
to emerging markets. But the authorities
need to ensure policies are in place to best
benefit from foreign investor flows into lo-
cal markets and avoid the instability that
can be associated with these flows.
Investors continue to move out the risk
spectrum in a search for yield, and risky
assets continue to perform well. At the sa-
me time, volatility has fallen to generatio-
nal lows across a wide range of assets,
and many investors appear to have adop-
ted similar trading strategies, in many ca-
ses ones predicated on a continuation of
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the benign scenario. However, investors ap-
pear to be giving insufficient weight to downsi-
de risks and might assume that the low risk
premia are a permanent feature of the finan-
cial market landscape. Importantly, the cycli-
cal factors contributing to the low volatility en-
vironment – abundant lowcost liquidity, low
leverage in the corporate sector, and high risk
appetite – may reverse. 
A transition from the current state of low vo-
latility to one in which volatility returns to his-
torically more normal levels would likely not
be straightforward. The task has been made
more difficult by the rapid growth of some in-
novative instruments and the build-up of le-
verage in parts of the financial system. Carry
trades have grown and the unwinding of tho-
se trades has potential to cause perturbations in markets.
A »volatility shock« – perhaps caused by a downward shift
in growth expectations or by renewed inflationary pressu-
res – could precipitate portfolio adjustments and raise un-
derlying volatility. 
Markets are anticipating a benign slowdown but
downside risks remain
Global growth has been relatively strong as growth rates
in key economic regions have converged. As the U.S. eco-
nomy has slowed, there has been a limited decoupling of
the other major economic areas (see Figure 1). Against this
backdrop, markets have focused on risks of a more pro-
nounced slowdown in the U.S. economy around this fa-
vorable outlook. Private forecasts have become less opti-
mistic and slightly more uncertain since September (see
Figure 2).
Equity markets appear to expect a soft landing for the U.S.
economy as a rebalancing of global growth occurs (see Fi-
gure 3). In the United States, weaker residential investment
helped pull third quarter U.S. GDP growth down to a 2.2per-
cent annualized pace, but so far there appears to be only
limited spillover from the housing market to other areas of
the economy. Recent labor market developments point to
sustained growth, with payroll rosters and wages expan-
ding at a moderate pace, all supporting consumption. Al-
ready, U.S. markets are starting to foresee the time when
the housing market downturn will have run its course. Ho-
wever, other sectors of the economy have also started to
show signs of softening. Manufacturing indicators have wea-
kened considerably since the summer, while factory and
durable goods orders have turned abruptly lower. Against
this backdrop, markets anticipate that the U.S. Federal
Reserve will begin to cut rates next year in support of a
soft landing. Bond markets point to further softening of the
economy ahead as real yields have declined and the yield
curve remains inverted. In contrast, the out-
look for Europe has been bolstered by a se-
ries of positive economic data surprises,
which has supported equity markets in the
region. Investment is leading growth, but con-
sumption has accelerated of late, suggesting
that the recovery is broadening and beco-
ming more self-sustaining.
As the United States’ advantage in growth
and interest rate differentials continues to nar-
row, the dollar has come under renewed pres-
sure. The initial dollar adjustment fell princi-
pally on European currencies, while the yen
and some other Asian currencies moved
much more modestly. The recent decline in
the dollar has been orderly and the increase
in volatility was much lower and short-lived
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than that experienced during the May/June 2006 correcti-
on, which was triggered by concern about inflation risks and
consequences for growth as the Fed would respond with
higher rates (see Figure 4).
However, risks remain that could upset this benign outlook.
Market expectations of inflation in the United States have
fallen considerably in the last few months on the back of
falling oil prices and a successive stream of favorable infla-
tion surprises. However, the average level of expected in-
flation over the next 10 years, though declining somewhat,
remains relatively elevated. In addition, tension remains bet-
ween the market consensus of abating inflation that would
allow the Fed to cut rates, and the continued concerns ex-
pressed by the Fed over inflation risks. An inflation shock
would force markets to reassess the outlook for price sta-
bility and the associated path of easing by the Federal Re-
serve, likely sparking a significant rise in volatility across mar-
kets and a rise in risk premia. Second, growth could slow
more sharply in the United States if the hou-
sing market undergoes more significant pres-
sures, the indirect effects on consumer spen-
ding become more apparent, and increases
in household wealth cease. Last, in the event
of a harder landing in the United States, the-
re remains concern whether growth elsewhe-
re can be self sustaining. Should these risks
transpire, there would likely be a more serio-
us test to global financial stability.
The cooling housing market may 
increase risks in the mortgage sector
The shift in recent years toward more risky
mortgages may make segments of the mort-
gage credit markets more vulnerable to the
deceleration in housing prices. Innovations in the originati-
on of mortgages have allowed a widening range of borro-
wers to finance more expensive homes at a given income
level. These include mortgages for subprime borrowers,
mortgages with high degrees of leverage, and mortgages
that feature sharply rising monthly payments, resulting in
»payment shock« (see Figure 5). More than half of mortga-
ges originated in 2005 and 2006 are estimated to contain
provisions that will eventually lead to a sharp rise in pay-
ments, even if the level of market interest rates does not
change. Furthermore, as shorter-term interest rates have in-
creased in recent years, rising payments on conventional
adjustable rate mortgages will add to payment shock.
Although the overall level of home equity remains high, a
recent study suggested there may be significant pockets of
home purchasers with low or negative equity; that is, mort-
gage debt in excess of the value of their homes. This may
owe to several factors, including falling home
prices in some regions, mortgages that initi-
ally allow for a buildup of debt over time, and
the fact that some homeowners may have
overpaid for their homes at the speculative
height of the market, facilitated by overly libe-
ral underwriting. Thus, homeowners with small
or no equity cushions in their homes may find
the payment shock difficult to manage. 
So far, delinquency rates have picked up on-
ly slightly, and only in the subprime segment.
Mortgage spreads have remained low, partly
reflecting the broader search for yield, and sug-
gesting that markets may be complacent in
pricing risk. As payments increase, default
rates in the subprime sector are likely to rise.
A sharp economic downturn could increase
homeowner defaults more significantly, increa-
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sing credit risk in the mortgage and household credit sector
more broadly. 
The bulk of the riskiest mortgage-related securities have
been packaged into structured products such as collatera-
lized debt obligations (CDOs). An important reason for this
is the demand by institutional investors, including foreign
ones, for high-quality fixed-income securities. CDOs can
create these securities from underlying securities of mid-le-
vel credit quality by concentrating all the risk into a small
amount of very risky securities. The higher-risk securities are
reportedly bought largely by hedge funds, that, it is suppo-
sed, are equipped to manage higher risks. However, the pa-
ckaging and repackaging of risk in this sector is extremely
complex, and it is difficult therefore, to identify with any cer-
tainty the ultimate holders of risk. The recent closure of two
small subprime mortgage originators highlights signs of
stress in that segment of the market, as well as in the se-
curitization process and distribution system
for subprime mortgages.
Markets appear complacent despite
downside economic risks and 
underlying changes in 
financial conditions
Volatility has fallen to remarkably low levels
and risk spreads are historically tight. The reali-
zed volatility on U.S. equities is well below that
observed at this point in any of the last three
business cycles (see Figure 6). Several
structural reasons have been put forward to
explain the low levels of volatility. One is that
inflation risk is less of a concern, partly becau-
se emerging economies, in particular China
and India, can help meet growing global de-
mand for both goods and services despite nar-
rowing capacity constraints in industrial coun-
tries. Others appeal to a shallower credit cy-
cle due to improved macroeconomic policies,
including the credibility attached to central
banks. In addition, the wider dispersion of risks
in the financial system, facilitated by financial
innovations and deepening markets for credit
derivatives, may also have contributed to lo-
wer volatility. Nevertheless, there remains a cy-
clical component to low volatility that can be
explained by, first, still abundant global liquidi-
ty, second, relatively low corporate leverage,
and third, elevated risk appetite. 
Turning first to liquidity conditions, (see Fi-
gure 7) suggests that in moving from very low
to higher interest rates, financial volatility res-
ponds only with a lag. The long period of ample liquidity in
this business cycle has encouraged the search for yield
and high risk appetite, and this is likely to take time to work
through. And even as U.S. monetary policy has tightened,
liquidity has remained ample elsewhere. The conjunction of
low volatility in currency markets with, in some cases, high
cross-border interest rate spreads has led to a rise in »car-
ry« trades in which investors borrow in a low interest rate
currency to invest in higher yielding currencies, taking on,
however, currency risk in the process. 
Favored funding currencies for these trades have been the
Japanese yen, and, to a lesser extent, the Swiss franc. Mea-
suring the size of the yen carry trade is difficult, but there is
evidence of substantial participation of foreign investors in
this trade at various times over the past two years. One in-
direct indicator is from the Japanese balance of payments.
Domestic Japanese investors have been increasing their
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purchases of foreign assets (largely bonds) for
several years, peaking in 2005. They have fal-
len somewhat this year but remain substanti-
al. However, starting in 2005 and picking up
in 2006, »other« investment outflows (which
include banking and derivatives flows) have
surpassed net bond outflows as the dominant
form of private sector capital outflow (see Fi-
gure 8). Crossborder yen lending by Japane-
se banks would show up as these »other« out-
flows, consistent with the notion that foreign
investors are borrowing in yen to finance in-
vestments in areas that offer higher yields, in-
cluding emerging markets (see below). Addi-
tional evidence comes from trading of cur-
rency futures contracts on the Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange. Here, »noncommercial« in-
vestors, who have no underlying currency
transaction to hedge, had large short yen po-
sitions in 2005 and early 2006, and again af-
ter the market turbulence of May-June 2006
subsided. Positioning in the Swiss franc, anot-
her low yielding currency, has closely followed
that in the yen. While these futures markets
positions cover only a small segment of pro-
fessional market activity, they may provide a
useful barometer of the broader market.
Second, corporate leverage is still low rela-
tive to past cycles. With profitability and cash-
flows strong, the balance sheets of the cor-
porate sector have continued to improve (see
Figure 9). The gearing ratios of listed firms in
all major markets have continued to decline.
In part, this reflects the fact that corporate
investment, though rising, is still modest. The
low level of borrowing is one of the factors that
has kept default rates at historic lows for lon-
ger than had been anticipated, and lower than
is usual at this stage in the credit cycle.
However, this is finally changing as corpora-
te leverage in private markets has been rising.
One of the most striking features of financial
markets over the last year or so has been the
massive increase in private equity buyouts,
in most cases using leveraged loans as part
of the financing (see Figure 10). In the
12 months ending September 2006, total le-
veraged loan issuance reached almost
$900 billion. The expansion has been fueled
by the growth of private equity groups that ha-
ve enjoyed huge inflows from real money in-
vestors. Valuation metrics for leveraged buy-
outs look increasingly stretched and pricing is
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getting finer. Firms are being bought out at
increasingly high multiples of their earnings,
and the degree of leverage used has reached
record highs. In many cases, the buyout
groups rapidly recoup part of their investment
via dividend and fee payments, which pushes
up the leverage in the target firm even further.
Ratings agencies so far remain relatively san-
guine about the leveraged buyout market.
Default levels remain low and liquidity flowing
into the sector is vast. However, some warn
that business plans of those that engage in
buyouts would not look so attractive if global
growth were to slow rapidly or if interest ra-
tes were to rise. The U.K. Financial Services
Authority (FSA) recently completed a review
of private equity and found that the exposu-
res of U.K. banks to private equity were sig-
nificant and rising, but were mitigated by the
distribution of some of the risks to institutio-
nal investors.
The third factor holding volatility down is the
rise in risk appetite across a wide range of
assets. This is evidenced by the tight spre-
ads and rising valuation ratios in mature mar-
kets discussed above, but also in emerging
markets where the search for yield is moving
up the »risk curve« into more risky assets in
emerging markets and into new frontiers. So
far this year, emerging market equities are the
bestperforming major asset class, in spite of
the sharp sell-off in May/June (see Figure 11).
In addition, emerging market debt, both ex-
ternal and local, has produced higher returns
than all other fixed-income classes, except for
high-yield corporate debt. Investor flows in-
to emerging market asset classes have been
strong and allocations are increasingly being
made to more »exotic« assets. 
For instance, as sovereign issuance on inter-
national capital markets has declined, corpo-
rate issuance has filled the void (see Annex).
This »crowding in« of private sector corpora-
te bonds is welcome, and is underpinned by
improving fundamentals in many emerging
markets, as well as the needs of emerging
markets for greater private sector investment
and credit. But such increased holdings by
foreign investors of more risky assets is also
driven by the search for yield as sovereign
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Also, foreign investor interest in sub-Saha-
ran Africa increased in 2006, albeit from a
low base. Dedicated emerging market hed-
ge funds and institutional investors have be-
come increasingly active in this region recent-
ly, especially in local currency debt markets.
Market intelligence suggests Nigeria recei-
ved inflows of around $1 billion in the first half
of 2006, and there have also been significant
flows to Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda,
and Zambia. Investors have been attracted
by high yields, improving macroeconomic
fundamentals, and diversification benefits.
Also important to the growth of this market
is that the number of sub-Saharan assets
that can be settled on Euroclear, the leading
international securities settlement platform,
has grown significantly over the last year, re-
ducing settlement costs for foreign investors.
The potential transition from the current state 
of low volatility poses challenges for financial 
stability
Looking ahead, the cyclical factors contributing to the low
volatility environment – liquidity, leverage, and risk appetite
– could reverse. Despite the low level of volatility in individual
asset classes, as mentioned above, correlations between
asset classes appear to be rising along with risk appetite
and the search for yield. If these positive correlations were
to persist, or even to rise, in a sell-off, the traditional diver-
sification benefits of investing in a wide variety of asset clas-
ses might be less than investors expect. The possibility that
the correlations may persist underscores that investors may
eventually demand higher risk premiums.
The transition from the current state of low
volatility but increased vulnerability to one
in which volatility returns to historically mo-
re normal levels may not be straightforward.
The task has been made more difficult by
the rapid growth of some innovative instru-
ments and the build-up of leverage in parts
of the financial system. Carry trades have
grown and the unwinding of those trades
has potential to cause perturbations in mar-
kets. A »volatility shock« – perhaps caused
by a downward shift in growth expectations
or by renewed inflationary pressures – could
precipitate portfolio adjustments and raise
underlying volatility. Many hedge funds ha-
ve reportedly sold options as a source of
premium income – one reason that volatili-
ties implied by option markets have fallen
so low. This suggests that such funds are exposed to any
sudden turn in market sentiment and, in that event, might
scale back their provision of insurance against volatility,
which would tend to raise implied volatility further.
As experienced in May-June 2006, a rapid unwinding of
carry trades, perhaps due to an increase in volatility, could
lead investors to retrench from some emerging markets.
The September GFSR underscored that several countries
in the Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region
have high current account deficits coupled with a heavy
reliance on portfolio inflows. This makes them more sen-
sitive to global risk conditions, reflected in high and 
(negative) correlations with a measure of global risk aver-
sion of roughly three times those in other regions (see Fi-
gure 13). In particular, trades that have attracted signifi-
cant inflows from foreign investors in recent years are al-
so liable to unwind rapidly if risk aversion increases (see
Figure 14).


































































Global Risk and Emerging Market Currencies
Source: Bloomberg L.P.; JPMorgan Chase & Co; IMF staff estimates.




















Crowded Trades in Local Markets
Source: Deutsche Bank; national authorities; IMF staff estimates.
Number of days
Note: The chart shows the stock of foreign equity and local bond positions divided by the average daily 
spot foreign exchange turnover as of end-April, to give an indicator of how many days it might take for 
foreign investors to fully unwind their local positions.
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Growth in private debt into Eastern
Europe and Central Asia has increa-
sed rapidly
The September GFSRalso drew attention to
the increase in cross-border private debt
flows into emerging markets and into Eas-
tern Europe in particular. Growth in private
debt to a number of Eastern European coun-
tries has continued to grow very rapidly. Fo-
reign-currency-denominated bond issuance
by Russian entities, having started from a low
base, is now running at a $20 billion annual
rate, in part reflecting favorable macroeco-
nomic conditions and the improving credit
quality of some borrowers. However, increa-
singly, issuance is being dominated by banks,
with recent issuers including some less well-
known banking sector names (see Figure 15).
As well, capital adequacy of these banks is under pressure
from strong domestic loan growth, which has averaged about
75 percent over the past four years, as many firms and
households are able to access credit for the first time. Banks
are now relying on capital markets for around a third of their
funding, leaving them with substantial rollover risk. The chal-
lenges are at least as great for Kazakh banks. Lending to
Kazakh banks has also grown rapidly, and, as a proportion
of GDP is higher than lending to Russian banks. 
Annex
Table Emerging Market External Financing
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